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Abstract
FaB Paxos[5] sets a lower bound of 5f + 1 replicas for any two-step consensus protocols tolerating
f byzantine failures. Yet, hBFT[3] promises a two-step consensus protocol with only 3f + 1 replicas.
As a result, it violates safety property of a consensus protocol. In this note, we review the lower bound
set by FaB Paxos and present a simple execution scenario that produces a safety violation in hBFT. To
demonstrate the scenario, we require a relatively simple setup with only 4 replicas and one view-change.
1 Introduction
A byzantine fault tolerant consensus protocol involves a set of replicas N to reach an agreement on a common
value among correct replicas in the presence of f malicious replicas. Fast byzantine consensus protocols such
as FaB Paxos[5] requires only two communication steps to reach consensus in the common case. A common
case execution consists of a (possibly honest) proposer replica proposing to all replicas among which at most
f replicas could be byzantine faulty. In this setup, FaB Paxos requires at least 5f + 1 replicas and sets a
lower bound of 5f + 1 replicas for any two-step consensus protocols tolerating f byzantine failures. In the
same common case setup, hBFT[3] promises a two-step consensus protocol with an optimal (i.e. 3f + 1)
number of replicas. However, this violates the lower bound set by FaB Paxos and as a result, the protocol
fails to guarantee safety property of a consensus protocol.
In this note, we review the lower bound of 5f + 1 replicas required for any two-step byzantine fault
tolerant consensus protocol and present a simple scenario in which a single faulty primary can break safety
of hBFT protocol. In [1], Abraham et al. show a similar safety violation in Zyzzyva [4]. Zyzzyva also requires
3f +1 replicas to reach consensus in two communication steps. However, Zyzzyva’s common case execution
involves an optimistic execution where no failure occurs and all 3f + 1 replicas respond identically. This
does not constitute a violation of the lower bound for a common case execution with at most f byzantine
failures. The safety violation in Zyzzyva is a result of incorrectly selecting a possibly committed value during
view-change; a process by which a new leader replica is selected. In [2], Abraham et al. propose a correct
solution to fix the issue.
2 Preliminaries
In this note, we consider byzantine fault tolerant consensus protocols involving a group of replicas among
which at most f replicas can suffer byzantine failures. The replicas exchange messages to agree on a common
value. The communication channel is authenticated, reliable and asynchronous; messages sent between
replicas are never lost, but may take a long time before they finally arrive. In the consensus protocol, one
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replica is chosen as the primary and other replicas are backups. The primary is responsible for proposing
values to other replicas. A value is said to be committed when a quorum (usually N − f) of replicas have
accepted a common value.
The consensus protocol should satisfy following properties:
Agreement. All correct replicas commit on a common value. This property is also called safety.
Validity. A value committed by a correct replica must be proposed by a primary.
Termination. A value proposed by a primary must eventually be committed provided the communication
channel is eventually partially synchronous.
FaB Paxos is a generic consensus protocol designed only for reaching agreement. It separates the roles of
replicas into proposers, acceptors and learners. The proposer is analogous to the primary and the acceptors
and learners are analogous to the backups. In contrast, hBFT is a full state machine replication (SMR)
protocol–involving both agreement and execution of proposed values and classify replicas into only primary
and backups. For brevity, we adopt a common convention of classifying replicas into primary and backups
and concern only with agreement phase of the protocol.
A view represents the system state with a distinct primary. Views are numbered by view numbers. In a
view v, the primary proposes a value to other replicas via PREPARE messages. A replica responds to the
PREPARE message by sending COMMIT messages to all other replicas. We use a common convention of
PREPARE and COMMIT messages in exploring both protocols. When a replica fails to collect a quorum of
COMMIT messages within a certain timeout interval, it triggers a view-change sub-protocol. A View-change
sub-protocol is a common technique employed to elect a new primary and ensure progress. In view-change
sub-protocol, replicas send values sent by the primary of view v. The view-change sub-protocol must ensure
that a value committed at a correct replica in view v stays committed even in the new view v + 1.
3 Skeletal Overview of FaB Paxos
FaB Paxos is an easy two-step consensus protocol. It requires a total of N = 5f + 1 replicas to reach
agreement in the common case. In a view v, the primary proposes a value m to other replicas by sending
PREPARE messages. Replicas accept the PREPARE message if they haven’t already accepted other values
for view v. If they accept the PREPARE message for value m, they reply to all other replicas by sending
COMMIT messages. A value m is effectively committed at view v when 3f+1 correct replicas have accepted
the value m at view v. A correct replica considers a value m committed when it receives N − f (i.e. 4f +1)
COMMIT messages for value m at the same view.
A replica may fail to collect N − f COMMIT messages for a value m within certain timeout interval
either because of a faulty primary has sent PREPARE messages for different values to different replicas
or because of the inherent asynchrony in the communication channel. In either case, the replica initiates a
view-change in which it sends signed copy of its most recent accepted value to the new primary of view v+1.
The new primary waits for only 4f +1 signed responses from the backups as f byzantine faulty replicas may
not respond. With 4f + 1 signed responses, the new leader constructs a progress certificate which serves as
a proof to identify a possibly committed value.
A progress certificate vouches for a value m if there is no other value m′ that appears at least 2f + 1
times in the progress certificate. The new primary proposes the value m vouched by the progress certificate
in the new view v+1 along with the progress certificate. Replicas change their accepted value to the value m
proposed by the new primary if the progress certificate vouches for the value m. With eventual synchrony,
a (possibly correct) primary will propose same value to all replicas and all correct replicas will accept the
same value common value. The protocol completes when all correct replicas have accepted the same value
and send COMMIT messages for the value.
Informal Sketch of Lower Bound
Assume A be the minimum number of replicas required. An asynchronous consensus protocol tolerating f
byzantine faults may wait for only A − f replies in any step as f byzantine faulty replicas may not reply.
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However, f replicas, whose replies weren’t received, may be correct and only the communication channel is
slow. As a result, the replies from f byzantine faulty replicas may still be included in A − f replies that a
correct replica collects.
A correct replica considers a value m committed when it receives A− f identical COMMIT messages for
the value m. Out of these A − f replicas that accepted value m, only A − 2f replicas may be correct and
at most f replicas could be byzantine faulty and may change their decision later. f other replicas whose
COMMIT messages aren’t included in A− f COMMIT responses could be correct and might have accepted
a different value m′. At this stage, few replicas may not receive required A − f COMMIT responses in a
timely manner triggering a view-change.
A consensus protocol must ensure that a value once committed stays committed at all future times.
During view-change, the new primary collects A − f signed copies of accepted values from the replicas.
These A− f signed responses could contain responses from f correct replicas that accepted value m′ and f
byzantine faulty replicas that could equivocate and change their accepted value to m′. In total, there could
be 2f votes for value m′. To ensure a committed value stays committed, the number of votes for value m
must be more than 2f , the minimum being 2f + 1. Hence, A− f = 2f + 2f + 1, (i.e A = 5f + 1)
4 Skeletal Overview of hBFT
hBFT is a recent addition to byzantine fault tolerant SMR protocol that speculatively executes operation
op specified in a proposed value m before the value m is committed. It consists of four sub-protocols–
(i) agreement (ii) checkpoint (iii) view-change (iv) client suspicion. We review only the agreement and
view-change sub-protocols to show the safety violation.
A SMR protocol assigns a distinct sequence number n to a value m such that the pair (n,m) is consistent
among all correct replicas. For a given sequence number n and view v, the primary proposes a value m by
sending PREPARE messages for it. Replicas accept the value m if they haven’t accepted other values for
n. Each replica sends COMMIT messages for value m to all other replicas. A correct replica considers a
value m committed at n when it receives 2f +1 identical COMMIT responses from other replicas (including
itself). This set of 2f +1 COMMIT messages for value m forms a commit certificate. The commit certificate
for value m at some sequence number n serves as a proof that a value has been committed at n.
A replica initiates a view-change when it fails to receive 2f + 1 COMMIT messages within certain time
duration or when it receives f + 1 COMMIT message for a different value m′ than the one it received in
PREPARE message. To initiate a view-change, it sends VIEW-CHANGE messages to all replicas. The
view-change sub-protocol of hBFT differs from that of FaB Paxos– in hBFT, replicas send not only their
recently accepted value, but also a commit certificate (if any) in the VIEW-CHANGE message. A correct
replica can initiate view-change when it receives f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages from other replicas. The
new primary collects 2f +1 VIEW-CHANGE messages before initiating a new view v+1. This set of 2f +1
VIEW-CHANGE messages serves as a progress certificate in hBFT.
To ensure that a value committed in an old view stays committed even in the new view, the new primary
must choose possibly committed values based on the progress certificate and (possibly) re-propose them.
During view-change, the new primary selects a value m if there is at-least one commit certificate for m or
if there are at least f + 1 replicas who have accepted value m; or else NULL value is selected. The new
primary proposes the selected value m in the new view v+1 along with the progress certificate for sequence
number n. Replicas accept the selected value m for sequence number n if the progress certificate is valid and
m is selected as per progress certificate. With this scheme, the protocol claims all correct replicas agree on
a common value v at a sequence number n. Below we show a simple scenario that breaks this claim.
5 Breaking Safety
To demonstrate the issue, we adopt a similar explanation as presented in [1]. Consider four replicas i1, i2,
i3, i4 of which one, i1, is Byzantine. All replicas participate in the agreement sub-protocol to decide on a
common value for sequence number 1.
View 1: Primary i1
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1. In view 1, the primary i1 sends a PREPARE message for value a to replicas i2 and i3.
2. Primary i1 equivocates and sends conflicting PREPARE message for value b to replica i4.
3. Replicas i2 and i3 accept the well-formed PREPARE message, send COMMIT messages to other replicas.
4. Only Replica i3 receives 2f+1 identical COMMIT message for value a (including Primary i1’s PREPARE
message for value a).
Here, for Replica i3, value a is committed at sequence number 1.
5. Replica i4 also accepts well-formed PREPARE message for value b and sends COMMIT messages for
value b.
At this stage, all further messages are delayed triggering a view-change.
View 2: Primary i2
1. In view 2, primary i2 collects VIEW-CHANGE messages from itself, i1 and i4 as follows:
– Replica i2 sends its accepted value a.
– Replica i4 sends its accepted value b.
– Replica i1 (which is Byzantine) equivocates and sends value b.
Here, out of 2f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages, no commit certificate exists and f + 1 votes for value b.
As per the specification, primary i2 chooses b.
2. Primary i2 sends PREPARE messages to all replicas for value b.
3. Replicas i1, i2 and i3 accept well-formed PREPARE messages for value b and send COMMIT messages
for value b to all replicas.
4. Replica i1, i2 and i4 receive 2f +1 identical COMMIT messages for value b. For these replicas, value
b is committed at sequence number 1.
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